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I. INTRODUCTION
First, I would like to thank the panel members, in particular, Mr.
Edward Flaherty, for inviting me to participate in this meeting. I am most
grateful for this kind invitation.
Ladies and gentlemen, colleagues and friends;
On the 24th of October 2008 and during the 63rd anniversary of the
United Nations, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's message was: "If
we want to advance the global common good, we must secure global public
goods."'
Advancing the global good, and building a world of peace, security,
and prosperity for all are ideals and inspiration. Realizing these ideals
requires systems, legitimate governance, and resources. International
Organizations (lOs) are primary agents to deliver these public goods, and to
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1. Secretary General, Message on United Nations Day (Oct. 24, 2008), available at
http://www.un.org/events/unday/2008/sgnessage.shtml (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
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work with or for them is considered both a privilege and an honor. In fact,
the employment relationship between IOs and their staff extends way
beyond a contractual element to an allegiance to the organization.
Therefore, such relationship embeds additional elements to form an
ensemble of employment relations.2
However, for the last decade or so, scholars, observing the explosive
proliferation in number, scope, and ambitions of new IOs 3 are asking more
and more whether 1Os are agents of public good, or whether new 1Os are
established to compete with traditional nation-states for social power.4
While this is an important question to keep in mind, for this
presentation, I will focus on the employment relationship between lOs and
their staff; specifically, on the tension between workplace rights such as
"due process" and the entitlement to autonomy in governance afforded to
lOs. After describing the context in which this alliance was founded, its
purpose, and its global image, I analyze the standards of global
administrative law that are applied in the various research centers.
International Organizations claim autonomy; that is the power to
govern internal affairs independent of external reviewers or any public
scrutiny. In the shadow of that autonomy, I ask how lOs safeguard
workplace equality rights such as the right to "due process?" lOs promise
fair and equitable treatment. Is their independent governance legitimate?
That is, does it have the core elements that protect the legal position of the
staff? Do their administrative law mechanisms that are on paper match
those in practice?
To address these questions, I examine one of the eldest and largest
global programs of the World Bank, the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research (CGLAR), which funds and manages
fifteen (15) independent international research centers around the world.5
Although CGIAR does not possess a legal personality, and may not be
considered as an international organization; its alliance with the World
Bank, and the autonomous fifteen (15) international organizations make it
an interesting case study. I analyze the standards of global administrative
law being applied in the various research centers after describing the
context in which this alliance was founded, its purpose, and its global
2. C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 281 (2nd ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).
3. UNION OF INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZ4TION BY YEAR AND
TYPE (1909-1999), http://www.uia.org/statistics/organizations/ytb299.php (last visited Feb. 19, 2010).
4. JAN KLABBERS, Checks and Balances in the Law of International Organization, in
AUTONOMY IN THE LAW, 141 (Mortimer Sellers ed., 2007).
5. CGIAR, Who We Are, http://www.cgiar.org/who/index.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2010)
[hereinafter Who We Are].
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image. These standards include transparency and access to information,
procedural participation, reasoned decision, and the rights to review
administrative decisions. Based on this analysis I clarify the actual
administrative practices in the employment at these Centers and reflect on
how workplace equality rights, which are "on paper" match those "in
practice" and how 1Os autonomy impacts individual legal rights in the
international workplace.
II. CONTEXT, PURPOSE, AND IMAGE OF THE
CGIAR AND ITS RESEARCH CENTERS
In 1968, Robert McNamara, then the 5th president of the World Bank,
introduced into the Bank the "people's basic needs" approach, and shifted
6investments from a focus on the physical to the human part. He did so
because rapid industrialization had failed to benefit most of the poor. That
shift led to the promotion of distributional equity along with economic
growth. In the early 1970s, the Bank lending focused on improving
agriculture, public health, and education and so under these circumstances,
in 1971, the CGIAR was founded at the peak of "green revolution" and the
introduction of new dwarf varieties of wheat (led by Dr. Norman Borlaug),
and rice (Dr. Gurdev Khush and others).7 The purpose of the CGIAR was
to locate the best science-based tools and technologies in advanced
countries, and adopt them to benefit food-deficit countries and populations.8
CGIAR was the first and is the largest global public goods program to be
supported by grants from the World Bank.9 Initially, the CGIAR supported
four pre-existing international agricultural research Centers established by
the Ford and Rockefeller foundations: International Center for Tropical
Agriculture (CIAT) in Colombia; International Maize and Wheat
Improvement Center (CIMMYT) in Mexico; International Institute of
6. Sandra Blanco & Enrique Carrasco, Pursuing the Good Life: The Meaning of
Development as It Relates to the World Bank and the IMF, The Functions of the IMF and the World
Bank, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 80-81 (1999); Sandra Blanco & Enrique Carrasco,
The Functions of the IMF & the World Bank (1999) 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 67, accessed at
http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/ebook2/PDFFiles/Part-12.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2010); see also
Namita Wahi, Human Rights Accountability of the IMF and the World Bank: A Critique of Existing
Mechanisms and Articulation of a theory of Horizontal Accountability (2006) 12 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. &
Pol'y 331.
7. World Bank, The CGLAR at 31: An Independent Meta-Evaluation of the Consultative
Group on International Agricultural Research, Volume 1: Overview Report (2003)
http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/cgiar/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2010)[hereinafter World Bank].
8. Who We Are, supra note 5.
9. World Bank, supra note 7.
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Tropical Agriculture (IITA) in Nigeria; and International Rice Research
Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines.' 0
Today, the CGIAR is a strategic alliance of 64 Members (public and
private) to support 15 international Centers." Each center is legally
constituted as an independent self-governed organization with a legal
personality operating under an agreement with its host countries. CGIAR is
comprised of 25 developing and 22 industrialized countries, four co-
sponsors as well as 13 other international organizations with more than
8,000 CGIAR scientists and staff spread over 100 countries.
12
Over the years, the mission of the CGIAR expanded to achieving
sustainable food security and reducing poverty in developing countries
"through scientific research and research-related activities in the fields of
agriculture, forestry, fisheries, policy and environment."'
3
A. How Does the CGIAR Work and What is its Global Image?
The alliance is a "loosely connected" network of:
a) An executive Council and partners;
b) A Science Council; and
c) An independent international agricultural research Centers
supported by the CGIAR, and Center committees.
14
These are supported by the CGIAR System Office, which has a pivotal role
in the integration and administration of the System.
What image does CGIAR project? With the lack in a legal personality,
the World Bank's sponsorship and provision of the chairmanship give it an
international legitimacy. As the main co-sponsor, the World Bank hosts the
CGIAR. The secretariat, its staff, and its president nominates the CGIAR
Chair who is usually the vice president in charge of the Bank's agricultural
division.' 5 The CGIAR Chair subsequently selects the CGIAR director
who will also be a World Bank senior staff.'6 Maintaining its informal
structure, the CGIAR was founded "without a charter, rules of procedure, or
10. CGIAR, The Charter of the CGIAR System, § I 9,
http://www.cgiar.org/pdf/charte%202007_main%20text.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2010) [hereinafter
CGIAR].
11. CGLAR, supra note 10 §1 1.
12. Who We Are, supra note 5.
13. CGIAR Charter, supra note 10, § 1I, 16.
14. Id. § L, 2.
15. Id. § UI, 56.
16. Id. § II, 59.
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conditions or procedures for membership. 17  However, as the system's
activities expanded, a reform program was initiated in 2001, and a Charter
was drafted in 2004 and amended in 2006 and 2007. Decision-making
remains based on consensus rather than by vote.
18
Having a social purpose, the CGIAR is considered an instrument of
good and an organization with a progressive outlook (since 1992, it has had
an active gender diversity program). 19 Because of its mission and the fact
that each Center controls a specific technical expertise and information, one
can argue that CGIAR projects not a political agenda but a scientific and
technical mandate.
B. Do Administrative Law Mechanisms at These Centers Incorporate the
Global Administrative Law Requirements?
Before I explore this central question, I want to clarify some points
about the employment relationship between CGIAR Centers and their staff.
First, the employment relation is fragile. Due to the ad hoc funding
situation, the restricted, and project-based funding,2° the consensus
decision-making in the distribution of funding, and the fragmentation of or
competition among the fifteen (15) centers for resources; individual centers
may need to undergo various hiring and retrenchment cycles at all levels but
substantively at the base level employees. Therefore, short-term instead of
long-term contracts are the norm, and substantive resources remain
consolidated under the discretion of senior managers of individual centers
to ensure continuity and flexibility of research programs.
Second, the different centers operate in different social and legal
contexts. Eleven of the fifteen (15) centers are located in developing
countries where there are strong class, gender, and race power intersections.
The employment relationship of Internationally Recruited Staff (IRS) is
structurally different to that of Nationally Recruited Staff (NRS). Rules and
policies for nationally and internationally recruited staff also vary between
individual centers. Internationally recruited staff (fourteen to twenty
percent of the total staff) is governed by the 1Os and the host country
17. CGIAR, cgiarNews: CGIAR Charter Adopted by Acclamation (December 2004),
http://www.cgiar.org/enews/december2004/story_02.html (last visited 19 Feb. 2010).
18. CG1AR Charter, supra note 10, § IlI, 59.
19. See CGIAR, CGIAR Secretariat Publications: Gender Program Papers,
http://www.cgiar.org/publications/gender/index.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2010).
20. Anderson, Jock R. & Dalrymple, Dana G., The World Bank, the Grant Program, and the
CGIAR: A Retrospective Review, 63 (World Bank Operations, Working Paper No. 1, 1999).
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intervenes only as may be allowed under its treaty with the 1Os. 21 In
contrast, NRS are governed under national employment laws of the host
country and/or as agreed upon in the treaty.22
Third, as with other international organizations, the employment
relationship with staff extends beyond a contract to an ensemble of relations
(including statutory elements) 23 that may change as the organization sees fit,
and without further notice which are binding on staff.24  From a legal
perspective, the impact on the employment relation is very important. The
legal position of the international staff, for example, becomes weak in these
organizations. Having no legal access to national courts due to the
organization granted immunity and with the Centers' ability to reserve the
right to use various statutory elements in the conditions of employment, a
shift in the power dynamic between the employee and the employer would
be expected. 25 The equality base with the employer is altered and therefore,
staff bargaining ability is diminished, but the discretionary power of the
management is strengthened. So, in the shadow of these complexities and
the lack of own administrative tribunals to settle employment disputes with
their staff (some subscribe, on need basis, to the ILO administrative
tribunal26), CGIAR centers seek to incorporate administrative laws
standards to keep the employment relationship within the pale of law.
III. GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REQUIREMENTS AT CGIAR CENTERS
A. Transparency and Access to Information
As with other international organizations, the CGIAR Centers have
taken steps to make documents and records available to the public. Many
even created websites that furnish a core collection database.27 However,
documents describing procedural details of the institute's policies are not
easily accessible. Sometimes, they are not even available. 28 From those,
21. See Colombia and International Centre For Tropical Agriculture art. 4.9(a), May 5, 1987,
1515 U.N.T.S. 220, 225 (1988).
22. Id. art. 4.9(b).
23. de Merode v. The World Bank, Decision NO. 1 (World Bank Admin. Tribunal 1981),
http://Inweb9O:worldbank.org/cm/wbt/wbtwebsite.nsf/(resultsweb)/470F6C6098AI I FDF852569ED006
BB877 (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
24. Kaplan [1953] UNAT Judgment No. 19, §3.
25. AMERASINGHE, supra note 2, at 282.
26. Drago A. v International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI), Court of Cassation,
all civil sections, 19 February 2007, No. 3718 (unpublished), [LDC 827 (IT 2007).
27. Who We Are, supra note 5.
28. Id.
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which I was able to access, it seems that each center provides new staff
members with an internal document that contains guiding principles
applicable to all staff. The Center's document describes administrative
procedures in broad terms but lacks details and contains no procedural
guarantees of "due process," accountability standards for the executives,
clear enforceable anti-discrimination procedures, or access to an
independent and impartial justice system.
B. Procedural Participation
Thus, procedural participation is not being spread in a uniform or
complete way. Staff Rules and Regulations are silent on the procedural
guarantees of "due process." Substantive principles such as proportionality
and legitimate expectations are emerging, but unfortunately, the CGIAR
Centers do not refer to them, incorporate them into a legal mechanism, or
apply them.
C. Reasoned Decision
The requirement to provide a reasoned decision is a crucial factor in
rendering decisions broadly accepted by the staff, and furthering their
loyalty and commitment to the mission of the organization. Unfortunately,
at CGIAR centers, the described policies are subject to the limitation of host
country agreements, the actions of funding entities, and the laws and the
norms of the governments within which the Centers operate. Each Center,
therefore, preserves the right to act on such considerations and amend or
suspend any of its procedures with a self-monitored internal staff policy.
29
D. Review ofAdministrative Decisions
As for the review of administrative decisions, each Center has its own
internal Grievance or Appeal Committee, and details of the procedures
remain within the Human resource (HR) office of the organization.3 ° In
general, dispute resolution proceeds hierarchically by meetings first with
the supervisor then with the other branches of the executive management
team. And generally there is no reference to a right of access to court or
independent evaluation by external reviewers. As mentioned above, some
individual Centers had subscribed in the past to the ILO administrative
tribunal, however, the subscription seems to be based on ad hoc needs of
29. International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, Personal Policy Manual for Internationally
Recruited Staff 1 (2004), http://intranet.iita.org/resources/IRS%20policy/ 20manual.pdf (last visited
Feb. 19, 2010).
30. Id. at 24.
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the centers rather than an obligation from the center to its staff to safeguard
their workplace rights.
Apparently, there are no policies to protect whistleblowers or to
prevent discriminatory harassment in the workplace in all its forms, the
sexual and nonsexual. The current policies available on discrimination
seem to focus on discrimination as an individual pathological behavior
based on a sexual content in the workplace, rather than about sexism.
In summary, the CGIAR Centers seem to rely on broad administrative
rules that boost a notion of fairness in the employment relationship,
however leaving any procedural guarantees open and ambiguous in the
Staff Rules and Regulations without clear or transparent internal
accountability mechanisms, without reasoned decision-making, and without
independent reviews or access to even quasi-judicial courts.
This could support an argument that things are going well. Even with
the basic and minimal administrative law requirements that are in place,
CGIAR Centers are managing effectively the employment relationship, and
fostering a diverse and non-discriminatory workplace environment. Under
their by-laws they established a legal/rational governance process, and
accountability standards (basic, although minimal). 3  As they have been
doing for the last twenty years, they would continue to improve slowly their
internal laws by conducting more and more of training workshops, and
research or statistical studies to help employees cope better in the
workplace.
On the other hand, one could argue differently from these facts. One
can zoom a bit closer and investigate the progress achieved by the CGIAR
Centers in the past twenty years in the area of discrimination and gender
equity, and examine its impact. The analysis was based on existing
research data available from that program and a recent independent review
of the CGIAR.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF GENDER EQUITY AND
NON-DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES IN CGIAR CENTERS
The Gender Staffing Program began at the CGIAR in 1991 with a
mission to educate, research, and collaborate on gender equitable work
environments, as well as provide a resource for work opportunities for
women at CGIAR Centers.32 Many Centers made explicit commitment to
31. The by-laws of some centers can be accessed through the CGIAR website at
http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 19, 2010).
32. Deborah Merrill-Sands et al., Engendering Organizational Change: A Case Study Of
Strengthening Gender Equity and Organizational Effectiveness in an International Agricultural
[Vol. 16:2
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attract more women to their workplace, and to provide "a work environment
equally hospitable to and supportive of men and women., 33 In several of
these studies, a more consistent pattern is emerging for the internal affairs
of the institute; a fragmented administration that is ad-hoc, transient, and
supporting individuals' autonomy and independence through internal
competition rather than collaboration.34
Within this context, gender, as social constructed differences between
"man" and "woman," 35 has been very visible in CGIAR Centers. As with
any hierarchical organization, with the top manager white male CEO from a
Western society, individuals act according to certain prescribed cultural
notions reflecting norms of behavior of the outside society.36 To ensure
conformity within the workplace environment rules of conduct (implicit and
explicit), and other enforcement organizational mechanisms regulate gender
performance.37
Through the examination of several surveys over the years, figures
indicate that the numbers and proportion of IRS or NRS women have
increased over time; however there is a disparity between Centers and the
progress has been very slow. Some Centers have less than fifteen percent
of women staff whereas others have fifty-five percent women staff.38
Centers, which are located in developed countries, tend to have a higher
number of women staff.39 On average, at the CGIAR Centers, women make
up only twenty-seven percent of the total workforce, and only twenty
percent of that number are involved in Science, and nine percent in Center
management.40 These results suggest that the work environment, especially
in those Centers located in developing countries, is still mainly conducive
and supportive of men rather than women.
Research Institute 16 (CGIAR, Working Paper No. 21, 1999),
http://www.worldbank.org/html/cgiar/publications/gender/gender21 .pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2010).
33. Id. at 1.
34. Id. at 12.
35. Joan Acker, Inequality Regimes: Gender, Class, and Race in Organizations, 20 GENDER &
Soc'Y 441, 441-442 (2006) available at http://gas.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/20/4/441 (last
visited Feb. 19, 2010).
36. Johanna Bond, International Intersectionality: A Theoretical and Pragmatic Exploration
of Women's International Human Rights Violations, 52 EMORY L.J. 71, 98 (2003) [hereinafter Bondl.
37. Bond supra, note 36.
38. Gayathri Jayasinghe & Bob Moore, First the good news ... : Staffing In The CGIAR 2003
37 (CGIAR, Working Paper No. 40, 2003), http://www.genderdiversity.cgiar.org/resource/default.asp
(last visited Feb. 19, 2010).
39. Id. at 15.
40. Id. at 5.
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For example, survey results in that study also reveal that while the age
profile for scientist career structure for men at CGIAR Centers is typical,
the profile for women's careers shows a very significant decrease from the
35-44 age group. This trend suggests a lack in the ability of the Centers to
retain mid-career to senior women who would potentially be role models to
new-comers. Women departure patterns over seven years show that "IRS
women departures has exceeded men's in all but one of the seven years.
'
In HR files, women or men's departures were vaguely categorized as
"voluntary" or "non-renewal of fixed-term contracts" without a
comprehensive or a clear reasoned decision.42
A recent independent review of the CGIAR revealed that gender
analysis at these Centers is ad hoc and depends on individual initiative.
The CGIAR does not have a system wide policy to integrate gender into its
research centers. And when the review panel recommended a shift from an
advocacy-based approach to an accountability-based approach to integrate
gender equity into CGIAR, only twenty percent of the CGLAR's Board
Chairs and Center Executives responded favorably to this
recommendation.43
The Gender and Diversity Program has been less successful at
promoting accountability around systemic gender-based assumptions, or
assumptions based on recruitment category and hierarchy in the
employment of IRS or NRS women at CGIAR Centers. 44 Its role has been
limited to promoting career opportunities and conducting leadership
workshops to improve the working environment.
One can argue that gender equity within CGIAR Centers is complex
and no different than that in other international organizations. However,
considering:
a) The disproportionate impact that autonomy has on women
staff at these Centers;
b) The self-governed structure and its resistance to the
implementation of performance measures and
accountability approaches to integrate gender equity; and
41. CGIAR, Updated Analysis of Future Harvest Center Demographics CG1AR Gender &
Diversity Program, http://www.cgiar.org/exco/exco2/FutureHarvestDemographics.pdf (last visited
Feb. 19, 2010).
42. Gayathri Jayasinghe, supra note 38, at 39.
43. CGIAR Independent Review Panel. 2008. Bringing Together the Best of Science and the
Best of Development. Independent Review of the CGIAR System. Report to the Executive Council.
Washington, DC. 46,48-49.
44. Id. at49.
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c) The lack of any judicial review for employment cases or
procedural guarantees to internal hearings, one can also
argue that under the current administrative laws, autonomy
in the CGIAR does not safeguard gender equity, non-
discrimination policies, or due process in the employment
relationship with the staff.
V. CONCLUSION
To conclude, through the shadow of lOs autonomy and based on
available literature, I examined how the CGIAR Centers' administration
incorporates the generally accepted accountability standards in their
employment relationship with their staff. My analysis showed that while it
can be argued that the Centers possess at least minimal standards and
systems for accountability, there is a salient lack of safeguards for the staff.
First, the legal position of any staff member is weak and is not defended by
reasonable or adequate procedural guarantees. Second, the legal position of
any minority staff (women or possibly others) is even weaker due to the
compounded effect of contextual stereotyping at these workplaces. Based
on our analysis of the "goodness" intentions of administrative laws to
implement gender equity, the autonomy structure and current administrative
rules at these Centers seem to have a disproportionate impact on gender
equity. In my opinion, such an impact over an already weak legal position
for the staff in general and women in particular, would have substantive
effects on the employment relationship. The shift in power in these
international work places strengthens discriminatory practices, empowers
abuse of power under a legal structure, and thus perpetuates a form of
governance that lacks the basic foundations of legitimacy such as checks
and balances.
To secure some of the global public goods to those whose interests we
serve, CGIAR Centers may want to reflect on such practices and implement
more effective accountability standards or subject their administrative laws
to public scrutiny to prove that they live up to what they preach.
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